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163 
Trade Secrets and Confidentiality: Attorney Ethics in the 
Silent World of Tax Planning 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As multi-disciplinary practice become increasingly acceptable, a 
range of ethical and legal problems also becomes increasingly common. 
Since the legal profession has only recently developed some tolerance for 
multi-disciplinary practice, many of these ethical and legal problems 
remain unsolved.  This comment addresses one such problem involving 
confidentiality agreements between attorneys and accounting and 
financial planning firms.  Specifically, this comment discusses the issues 
involved when accounting and financial planning firms claim either trade 
secrets protection for, or a proprietary interest in, tax-planning strategies, 
and the potential ethical problems involved when attorneys bind 
themselves to confidence regarding such strategies.  This comment uses 
as its basic fact scenario an ethical analysis provided by the Illinois State 
Bar Association: 
Accounting Firm tells Client A that Accounting Firm will disclose to 
Client A a package of ideas that can significantly reduce Client A’s 
taxes if: (1) Client A pays Accounting Firm a fee for the information 
and (2) Client A and Client A’s Lawyer each enter into a 
confidentiality agreement pursuant to which Client A and Lawyer agree 
to never divulge the idea in the package.1 
Part II of this comment deals with trade secrets problems involved in 
this transaction, exploring whether an accounting or other financial 
planning firm may claim a proprietary interest in aggressive new 
strategies for minimizing tax liability, considering that such strategies 
become available and work only within the context of the publicly 
accessible Internal Revenue Code (IRC).  Part II also deals with the 
question of whether the law should protect the use of these strategies by 
attorneys. 
Part III of this comment deals with the contracts, ethics, and public 
policy issues arising from this transaction.  This section discusses 
whether an attorney unethically creates a conflict of interest between her 
client for whom she signs the confidentiality agreement and her other 
 
 1. Ill. State Bar Ass’n Advisory Op. on Prof’l Conduct, No. 00-01 (2000). 
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clients who do not have dealings with the outside firm.  It also addresses 
whether such an agreement unethically restricts the attorney’s ability to 
practice law and whether the attorney signing such an agreement 
unethically assists the accounting firm in the unauthorized practice of 
law.  Finally, Part III examines public policy concerns arising from third-
party beneficiary liability. 
II.  TRADE SECRETS PROTECTION FOR TAX-PLANNING STRATEGIES 
An increasing number of accounting firms2 seek to protect their 
strategies by claiming a proprietary interest and keeping them secret. 
[M]any financial advisers, in their efforts to woo new clients and retain 
old ones in today’s hotly competitive industry, are harnessing a 
marketing tool more familiar to people who sell soap or software.  
Treating certain strategies and the documents used to implement them 
as intellectual property, they are trying to slow the speed with which 
materials describing them leak into the public domain.  To do that, 
accounting firms, insurance companies, investment banks, and some 
law firms have asked clients and other advisers to sign [confidentiality 
agreements].  The premise behind these agreements is that the marketer 
has something that amounts to a trade secret: confidential information 
that could give them a competitive edge.3 
Thus accounting firms use confidentiality agreements to protect what 
they consider proprietary secrets.  Part III of this comment deals directly 
with the issue surrounding confidentiality agreements.  Because the law 
protects trade secrets even in the absence of such agreements, Part II 
considers only trade secret issues.  Further, even when the information 
the firm seeks to protect does not benefit from trade secrets protection, a 
confidentiality agreement may still protect the accounting firm’s interests 
in the information.  Thus, the issues surrounding the information’s trade 
secrets status and the issue surrounding the confidentiality agreements do 
not necessarily converge, and this comment deals with them as separate 
problems arising from separate bodies of law. 
A. Overview of Trade Secrets Law 
The first question centers on the formal status of theses tax-planning 
strategies and whether they rise to the level of trade secrets the law will 
protect.  The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), adopted in thirty-four 
 
 2. This comment will refer solely to accounting firms.  However, for convenience I use this 
term to refer to the whole range of non-attorney firms within the financial planning industry. 
 3. Deborah L. Jacobs, When Mum’s the Word, BLOOMBERG WEALTH MANAGER, Dec. 
2001/Jan. 2002, at 66. 
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states and the District of Columbia in one form or another,4 defines a 
“trade secret” as follows: 
“Trade secret” means information, including formula, pattern, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) 
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being 
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its 
disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.5 
Thus, for trade secrets law to protect an idea, the idea must produce 
an economic advantage to the proprietor by virtue of its secrecy.6  This 
definition also requires “reasonable” efforts by the proprietor to protect 
the secret from public disclosure.7  Finally, to constitute a trade secret 
under this definition, another person must not have the ability to readily 
ascertain the idea without resorting to improper means: 
[In order to recover, a] plaintiff claiming misappropriation of a trade 
secret must prove that: (1) the plaintiff possessed a trade secret; (2) the 
defendant is using that trade secret in breach of an agreement, 
confidence, or duty, or as a result of discovery by improper means; and 
(3) the defendant’s use of the trade secret is to the plaintiff’s 
detriment.8 
The UTSA definition, however, does not precisely answer the 
question of how “unknown” the secret must be in order to receive trade 
secrets protection.  Case law has developed to produce general guidelines 
in resolving this question.  For example, in Nebraska, and New York 
case law holds that “[a] trade secret is something known to only one or a 
few, kept from the general public, and not susceptible of general 
knowledge.”9  Further, “[i]f the principles incorporated in a device [and 
presumably in an idea or process] are known to the industry, there is no 
trade secret which can be disclosed.”10 
 
 4. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act has Been Adopted 
(1985). 
 5. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, § 1(4) (1985). 
 6. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, 
Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1199 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 7. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, § 1(4). 
 8. 54 AM.JUR. 2D, Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices § 1114 
(1996) (citations omitted). 
 9. Selection Research, Inc. v. Murman, 433 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Neb. 1989).  See also 
Abdallah v. Crandall, 76 N.Y.S.2d 403, 406 (1948) (following Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph 
Co., 138 N.E. 485 (N.Y. 1923)). 
 10. Murman, 433 N.W.2d at 532.  See also Garner Tool & Die v. Laux, 285 N.W.2d 219 
(Neb. 1979); Wilkin v. Sunbeem Corp., 466 F.2d 714 ( 10th Cir. 1972). 
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This final guideline produces a split in authority regarding whether a 
court should protect an idea that is susceptible to “reverse engineering” 
by others using principles “known to the industry.” Some jurisdiction 
will not protect such an idea whether or not the defendant in fact 
discovered the idea using generally known principles.11 On the other 
hand, some jurisdictions will protect the “idea person”12 to the extent that 
the defendant, while capable of reverse engineering the secret through 
the use of generally known principles, nevertheless used improper means 
to obtain the secret: “The fact that a trade secret is of such nature that it 
can be discovered by experimentation or other fair and lawful mean does 
not deprive its owner of the right to protection from those who would 
secure possession of it by unfair means.”13 Misappropriation of a trade 
secret is, after all, a tort and the law seeks both to reward the idea person 
for her creativity and to punish the tortfeasor for wrongdoing.14  Those 
jurisdiction that protect the idea person to the extent the defendant used 
improper means will nevertheless allow reverse engineering if the 
defendant invested the capital necessary to arrive at the idea independent 
of the idea person’s knowledge of it and investments to develop it.15 
B. Can Tax Strategies Be Protected? 
Accounting firms claim the protections outlined above for a wide 
variety of tax strategies, including: 
everything from income-tax strategies—for example, deferring taxes, 
creating deductions, changing the tax basis of property, or converting 
ordinary income to capital gain—to wealth-transfer tools and 
techniques for financing life insurance. . . .  The deal may involve a 
novel technique or one that is being widely used but that each firm 
executes with a slightly different twist.16 
These firms do not charge an hourly fee, but instead charge a premium 
for the use of such strategies thus bringing in revenue that far exceeds the 
initial investment to develop the strategy.17 
 
 11. See SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244 (3d Cir. 1985), aff’d 772 F.2d 896 
(3d Cir. 1985). 
 12. The term “idea person” refers to the inventor or developer of a proprietary idea.  I use this 
term to refer either to the actual individual responsible for the idea’s creation, or to the firm or entity 
claiming ownership of the idea from its inception. 
 13. Kubik, Inc. v. Hull, 224 N.W. 2d 80, 89 (1974) (quoting HARRY D. NIMS, UNFAIR 
COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS, § 148 (1947)). 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 66. 
 17. Id. 
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Accounting firms that seek to protect tax-planning strategies with 
trade secret laws implicate the difficult questions and splits of authority 
outlined in Part IIA above.  Notably, tax-planning strategies necessarily 
involve principles generally known in the financial and estate planning 
industries.  For example, trust, gifts, business entities, tax deferral 
mechanisms, a wide variety of investment vehicles, and so on constitute 
the basic grammar of tax planning.  Anyone initiated into the world of 
tax planning knows the basic principles of these mechanisms, which 
work and must be understood within the context of the Internal Revenue 
Code. 
Thus, a very difficult question arises from the outset regarding 
whether the strategies that accounting firms seek to protect rise to the 
level of trade secrets as a matter of law.18  After all, the industry knows, 
and for the most part thoroughly understands, all of the tools and 
principles involved in tax planning and lacks only knowledge of the 
exact combinations of these tools and principles used to benefit a given 
profile of clients.  Of course, some authority suggests that even where all 
the individual components of a trade secret receive general circulation in 
the industry, the law will still protect the particular combination of the 
elements.  “The fact that some or all of the components of the trade 
secrets are well-known does not preclude protection for a secret 
combination, compilation, or integration of the individual elements.”19  
The point here is that tax-planning strategies have a very particular 
character within the world of proprietary idea. 
Some advisers . . . question whether there really are all that many new 
and proprietary ways to make money for clients or save them a bundle 
on taxes.  With everybody reading the same law, court cases, and IRS 
rulings, “it’s only reasonable to assume that people think in parallel 
terms and can come up with the same or similar solutions to a 
problem.”20 
A plaintiff may not be able to make a very strong argument that there 
is a trade secret involved where the defendant has the skills necessary to 
devise the strategy on her own.  Further, the proprietor must show that 
the strategy is virtually unknown in the industry.  A showing that the 
industry does not generally know the strategy does not give rise to the 
 
 18. Accordingly, most firms do not seek to rely solely on trade secrets law, and seek instead 
to impose confidentiality agreements on all those to whom the firms disclose the strategies.  This 
comment analyzes these confidentiality agreements in Part III as the central and most important 
issue. 
 19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. f (1995). 
 20. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 72.  (Arthur Meyers is “a lawyer and employee-benefits specialist 
with Hutchins, Wheeler & Ditmar in Boston.”).  Id at 66. 
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existence of a trade secret.  Put differently, a strategy that is mostly 
unknown “may not be converted into confidential information merely by 
accumulating the information by one’s own efforts.”21  Since the plaintiff 
in a tort action has the burden of proving misappropriation, it seems very 
unlikely (or at least immensely difficult) that any firm could prove by the 
preponderance of the evidence that the strategy exists only as the result 
of the plaintiff’s efforts, that no one else in the industry knows the 
strategy, that the defendant did not develop the idea, and that the 
defendant obtained the strategy through improper means. 
Generally, an action for misappropriation of a secret tax-planning 
strategy will ensue under facts similar to those recited in the introduction, 
and thus, there often will arise no question as to the circumstances 
surrounding disclosure of the strategy—the plaintiff will probably prove 
that the plaintiff did in fact disclose the strategy to the defendant.  
However, this does not resolve whether use of the strategy after such 
disclosure constitutes “improper means.”  A court must determine the 
impropriety of the means of acquisition (in this case, acquisition from the 
accounting firm) within the context of the other questions listed above, 
namely whether others in the industry know the strategy, and whether the 
plaintiff’s disclosure of the strategy constituted the only way the 
defendant could have learned it and in fact did learn it.  This determines 
whether the strategy is a trade secret, which then bears on whether the 
defendant’s later use of the idea becomes improper. In other words, when 
a lawyer learns a tax-planning strategy from an accounting firm, the 
propriety or impropriety of the use of that strategy depends largely on 
whether the industry knows the strategy, and whether she could have 
learned the strategy in any legitimate way other than by the disclosure in 
question.  The accounting firm’s efforts to keep the strategy secret, even 
coupled with a lack of general circulation in the industry, does not settle 
the propriety question until the court determines that the strategy rises to 
the level of trade secret.22 
In those jurisdictions requiring actual investment in the reverse 
engineering process to avoid misappropriation liability, the problem is 
compounded because developing a tax-planning strategy may require a 
great deal more time and effort for some than for others, depending on 
the relative skill of the professional.  An elite tax planner may require 
virtually no investment in time or effort to develop the strategy, 
protesting that all tax planners are not created equal, and might create it 
in a matter of seconds.  A court could not rationally impose on this elite 
 
 21. 54 AM.JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Practices § 1115 (1996). 
 22. I admit that this uses woefully circular reasoning, but this appears to be the general 
malaise of the entire body of trade secrets law. 
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planner the duty to invest to the same degree the plaintiff invested in 
order to escape liability. 
These problems all point to the difficulty involved when trying to 
prove a proprietary interest in a tax-planning strategy that would give 
rise to trade secret protection.  The second major problem, however, 
deals with whether a firm may claim a proprietary interest as a matter of 
law.  This problem arises from the economic realities of tax planning.  
Deborah Jacobs reports in Bloomberg Wealth Manager that often the 
strategies accounting firms seek to claim as a propriety interest either 
already circulate widely in the industry or do not work anyway, given 
that the accounting firm does not have the expertise necessary to analyze 
many of the legal problems invoked by the strategy.23 
Aside from these specious attempts to claim a proprietary interest, 
what about the case of a genuinely novel strategy, developed through 
actual investment, and which the would-be proprietor genuinely believes 
to be virtually unknown in the industry?  Would trade secrets law protect 
these strategies? 
Certainly the usual lengths to which accounting firms go to protect 
the strategy’s secrecy constitute “reasonable efforts” within the meaning 
of the UTSA use of that term.24  Firms place clients and their attorneys 
under confidentiality agreements not to disclose the content of these 
strategies, and these agreements require money to draft.  Surely a firm 
would not invest money, time and effort into protecting the secrecy of a 
strategy the industry already knows.  Some jurisdictions hold that efforts 
to protect the idea’s secrecy constitute “evidence that the secret has real 
value.”25  Such evidence does not end the inquiry, however, because it 
does not give rise to a presumption that the plaintiff in fact has 
something of “real value” to protect.26  Such a presumption would 
produce absurd consequences because anyone could create a trade secret 
surrounding any bit of common knowledge so long as she went to some 
lengths to keep the “idea” secret. 
Instead, the amount of effort in maintaining the secret constitutes 
only evidence of value, but not conclusive evidence.27  A court must still 
 
 23. See generally Jacobs, supra note 3. 
 24. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii). 
 25. Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Dev. Indus. Inc. 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Given the discussion below that tax strategies might in fact never be novel and largely 
known in the industry, these efforts to keep such strategies “secret” more likely amount to 
advertising schemes in which firms hope to attract clients by offering them something which their 
neighbors do not know, something dangerous, something cutting edge.  In other words, the 
confidentiality efforts probably reveal more about the psychic value of these strategies than their 
economic and trade secrets value. 
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inquire into the industry workings and realities to determine whether the 
firm has something worthy of trade secrets protection.  In the financial 
planning industry, such an inquiry may prove devastating to accounting 
firms’ proprietary claims. 
Developers know few strategies remain secret for long, but they hope 
to profit from a head start. . . . Many advisers . . . think information 
circulates so quickly they won’t have to wait long to learn about a 
technique through other channels.  “My network is so good that I could 
probably find out the strategy on my own,” says Albert Gibbons, 
president of AIG Financial Services in Phoenixville, Pa., who adds that 
colleagues have given him materials he knows were subject to 
confidentiality agreements.  “Would my client have to wait another 
week or another months or another 90 days?” he asks.  “Nothing’s 
going to hold out much longer than that.”28 
If Jacobs is correct that even the developers of tax-planning strategies 
have no expectation that their strategies will remain a secret for longer 
than a few weeks, then the claimed proprietary interest may not meet the 
UTSA requirement that the secret must “[derive] independent economic 
value . . . from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use.”29  Jacobs’ article seems to 
indicate that proprietors in fact expect other practitioners to obtain the 
strategies within a very short time, and that they hope only to gain as 
much economic advantage from the strategies as they can before the 
inevitable general disclosure. 
Of course, the proprietors will argue that this meets the very essence 
of the UTSA requirement that the secret must give the proprietor an 
economic advantage while it remains secret.  The other side of this 
argument, however, is that the UTSA, in the same sentence, requires that 
the secret not be “readily ascertainable by proper means.”30  As 
demonstrated above, determining what constitutes proper means under 
the circumstances must involve a highly fact-specific inquiry and 
somewhat circular reasoning.  Perhaps the best approach to solving this 
problem, then, would be to ask, “What does the industry generally do?”  
This question, of course, would very likely end in the answer that tax 
planners have nothing of “real value” to protect from other in the 
industry, given the general understanding of virtually all the principles 
and tools involved in tax planning and the relative speed and inevitability 
with which strategies disseminate.  The Massachusetts Superior court, 
 
 28. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 66, 70. 
 29. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (1985). 
 30. Id. 
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speaking in dicta, said that insurance providers and other businesses 
engaged in the sale of financial products “are hardly the kinds of 
businesses deeply steeped in trade secrets and other truly confidential 
materials.”31 
This inevitable and speedy dissemination of tax-planning strategies 
also gives rise to a third major problem for an accounting firm in 
claiming trade secret protection: “the defendant’s use of the trade secret 
[must be] to the plaintiff’s detriment.”32  In other words, the use of the 
secret must cause the plaintiff to lose the economic advantage which the 
secret otherwise afforded her.  In an industry where the economic 
advantages of the strategies have very short shelf lives, damage 
calculations may prove very speculative and uncertain.  This not only 
imposes enormous difficulty on a court to determine how much, if any, 
damages to award, but in fact undercuts the plaintiff’s proprietary claim 
to a trade secret which gives her an economic advantage, as required by 
the UTSA. 
C. Should Tax Strategies Be Protected? 
The above analysis does not suggest that no case will ever rise to the 
level of a trade secret that the law should protect.  This comment merely 
intends to emphasize the difficulty of asserting such a claim in the 
context of tax planning, given the realities of the industry.  Nevertheless, 
no court should use the above analysis to decree a blanket presumption 
against trade secret protection in then case of a tax-planning strategy.  
Instead, courts must determine the genuineness of a claimed trade secret 
on a case-by-case basis.  Courts must make this determination with an 
eye toward the policy concerns involved in trade secrets law generally, 
but with care to consider the overall character of tax-planning strategies 
that makes them unlikely candidates for trade secrets protection. 
III. CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTS WITH ACCOUNTING FIRMS 
Either from a recognition of the weak position of tax-planning 
strategies in trade secrets doctrine, or out of an attempt to bolster the 
trade secrets position by increasing efforts to keep them secret, or for 
both reasons, accounting firms generally do not rely solely on the 
protection afforded by trade secrets law.  Instead, they rely heavily on 
 
 31. Kruanelis v. Sentinel Benefits Group, Inc., No. CA000487C 2000 WL 33159206, at *1 
(Mass. Dist. Ct. 2000). 
 32. 54A AM. JUR. 2D,  Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices § 1114 
(1996) (citations omitted). 
PETERSON-MACRO 2/21/2003  4:06 PM 
172 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume XVII 
confidentiality agreements to bind clients and clients’ attorneys to silence 
in order to protect the claimed proprietary interest. 
The increasing use of confidentiality agreements during the past five 
years coincides with the growth of multidisciplinary efforts, in which 
advisers in various fields team up to better serve the client.  Yet these 
agreements have strained relationships new and old as recipients have 
divided into two camps: those who will sign and those who won’t.33 
At least two broad categories of problems make the prospect of 
signing such an agreement unpleasant at best and potentially devastating 
to an attorney’s career and her clients’ interests at worst.  First, 
confidentiality agreements potentially suffer from serious contract 
problems, possibly lacking definiteness and therefore enforceability.  
Second, confidentiality agreements put the attorney who signs them into 
very dangerous ethical territory, creating potential conflicts of interests 
between her clients, imposing unreasonable duties on potential clients, 
and restricting the free flow of competent legal advice. 
A.  Contract Problems 
1.  When the attorney signs an agreement: indefiniteness 
When offering to divulge a secret tax-planning strategy to an 
attorney in exchange for a signed confidentiality agreement, accounting 
firms generally phrase their promise like this, “The technique . . . could 
produce significant saving . . .” or the accounting firm has “developed a 
new, proprietary estate-planning technique that could save [the client] 
money in transfer taxes.”34 
In this transaction, the accounting firm (the promisor) clearly 
bargains for the attorney’s (the promisee’s) confidentiality in order to 
earn the fees from the client.  No doubt a court would find this contract 
to have consideration.  However, this contract probably lacks sufficient 
definiteness in the promisor’s promise, making the return confidentiality 
promise unenforceable. 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states: 
(1) Even though a manifestation of intention is intended to be 
understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract 
unless the terms of the contract are reasonably certain.  (2) The terms of 
 
 33. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 66. 
 34. Id. at 66, 67. 
PETERSON-MACRO 2/21/2003  4:06 PM 
163] TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIALITY 173 
a contract are reasonably certain if they provide a basis for determining 
the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.35 
Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, a leading case in certainty and definiteness, states the 
rule as follows: “Although the terms and requirements of an enforceable 
contract need not be stated in minute detail, it is fundamental that, in 
order to be binding, an agreement must be definite and certain so that the 
liability of the parties may be exactly fixed.”36  Farnsworth explains 
“examples of agreements that do not meet the [definiteness] requirement 
are those in which the description of the subject matter is inadequate, as 
in the case when the description or quantity of goods to be sold is 
lacking.”37  In other words, for a contract to be certain or definite enough 
to support an enforceable contract, it must describe in reasonably clear 
terms what exactly the promisor promises, such that a court can 
determine whether the promisor has fulfilled that promise. 
In the case of an accounting firm promising to divulge a tax-planning 
strategy in exchange for a confidentiality agreement, the promisee’s 
return promise to remain silent regarding the strategy clearly meets the 
definiteness requirement.  A court can determine with reference to the 
evidence at hand whether the attorney has revealed the strategy to 
anyone else, including the attorney’s other clients.  The problem of 
definiteness lies only in the promisor’s promise to reveal a secret tax-
planning strategy that will “benefit” the client or yield “significant 
savings.” 
This promise uses such vague terms that a court could hardly 
determine whether the accounting firm has in fact tendered to the 
attorney and her client a strategy as promised.  The promise does not 
describe anything about the means used in the strategy, or its ends in 
potential tax savings.  Were the court to set the standard such that any 
benefit whatever to the client, even one cent in tax savings, fulfills the 
promise to “benefit the client,” the court must then deal with even more 
uncertainty in muddling through unconscionability doctrine.  Instead, a 
court that insists that this contract has sufficient definiteness would better 
serve the interests of justice and the expectations of the promisee38 by 
substituting the promisor’s expectations of what “benefit” or 
“significant” means with the court’s or the promisee’s understanding of 
what those terms mean.  However, substituting the court’s judgment of 
 
 35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: CERTAINTY § 33(1981). 
 36. Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196, 200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983). 
 37. 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.27 (1990). 
 38. The expectations of the promisee serve as a foundational principle in contract law 
generally and definiteness doctrine specifically.  Id.  (“[T]he requirement of definiteness is implicit 
in the principle that the promisee’s expectation interest is to be protected”). 
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the meaning of such words produces its own problems because it forces 
to court to write terms of definiteness into the contract that did not 
appear there before litigation. 
Accordingly, a court should hold this contract unenforceable for lack 
of definiteness, in the absence of any clearer terms, such as “this strategy 
could save your client up to $X.”  A court might well require other 
elements of definiteness to appear in the contract, such as a discussion of 
the relative risk and aggressiveness involved in the strategy, particularly 
if the terms of the agreement state something like “this strategy will save 
your client $X.”  A discussion of the relative risk and aggressiveness 
would allow the promisee to know what she bargained for.  Without such 
a discussion, even if the strategy would in fact save the client the 
promised amount, it might involve such a high degree of risk and 
aggressiveness that no reasonable client, nor this client in particular, 
would consider using such a strategy and would not therefore bargain to 
receive such a strategy. 
After requiring reasonable certainty in disclosing to the client and 
her attorney enough details about the strategy that the contract becomes 
enforceable, a new problem arises.  Any discussion about the potential 
savings and relative risk and aggressiveness would almost inevitably 
involve some level of disclosure regarding the tools and combinations 
involved in the strategy itself.  This creates two problems.  First, if 
definiteness would require such disclosure, no accounting firm with a 
truly novel, worthwhile, and proprietary strategy would make such 
disclosure because such a disclosure would compromise the strategy’s 
secrecy and thus would compromise the economic advantage which the 
strategy gives to the firm.  The disclosure would compromise the 
economic advantage because now, in making the offer for a contract, the 
firm has already made the disclosures it promises to make in exchange 
for confidentiality.  If a firm does make a sufficiently definite offer, 
however, a second major problem arises in such contracts because now 
the firm has already performed its promise before binding the promisee 
to confidentiality.  In other words, the accounting firm asks the client and 
her attorney to bind themselves to confidentiality in exchange for past 
consideration, and past consideration cannot support a contract. 
Only if [the] action has not yet been taken when the promise is made 
can the promisor be bargaining for it when making the promise.  If the 
action has already been taken, the promisor cannot be seeking to induce 
it.  Such ‘past consideration’ – action already taken before a promise is 
made – cannot be consideration for the promise.39 
 
 39. Id. at § 2.7.  Farnsworth cites several cases in support of this.  “Plowman v. Indian Ref. 
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Applying Farnsworth’s language to our scenario, the “promisor” 
represents the client and her attorney, who promise to remain silent in 
seeking to induce disclosure.  If the promisee has already disclosed the 
strategy by the time the attorney and her client promise to remain 
confidential, then this past disclosure cannot constitute consideration, 
supporting enforceability of the client’s and the attorney’s promises to 
remain confidential.40  In fact, Jacobs reports that this scenario happens 
frequently.  “No matter what they say, when rich, ‘marquee’ clients are 
involved, promoters ‘will disclose the substance, if not the details, of the 
transaction to both the individual and his or her lawyer’ without a 
confidentiality agreement, Meyers says.”41 
Of course, courts must consider these promises on a case-by-case 
basis in determining their definiteness.  However, if the promise by the 
accounting firm meets the definiteness requirement, the promisee runs 
the risk of having disclosed too much, so that any promise by the client 
and her attorney to keep the strategy confidential does not become an 
enforceable contract for lack of consideration.  Such confidentiality 
agreements therefore swim in murky waters, and accounting firms may 
find that they are damned if they do disclose and damned if they don’t.  
The tension between the definiteness and consideration doctrines should 
not imply, however, that no confidential agreement would ever have both 
sufficient definiteness and consideration.  This comment simply 
emphasizes the extreme unlikelihood and difficulty in satisfying both 
requirements at the same time. 
2.  When the attorney refuses to sign an agreement: implied contracts 
and confidential relationships 
 
Aside from trade secrets protection and confidentiality agreements, a 
proprietor may protect its strategy by claiming an implied-in-fact 
contract with the person to who the proprietor discloses the idea, 
requiring confidentiality.42  The court in Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline 
Service Company outlined three distinct situations where ideas might be 
 
Co., 20 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ill. 1937) (promise of pension held unenforceable); . . . Allen v. Bryson, 67 
Iowa 951, 25 N.W. 820 (1885) (promise to pay for past legal services).”  Id. at n.1. 
 40. This not only undercuts the enforceability of the accounting firm’s desired confidentiality 
agreement, but it also potentially undercuts the firm’s trade secrets position.  If the firm goes about 
disclosing the strategy to potential buyers without first obtaining a confidentiality agreement, then 
the firm may no longer claim that it has taken “reasonable” steps to maintain the strategy’s secrecy.  
Without those reasonable steps to maintain secrecy, the law will not protect the strategy as a trade 
secret.  See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (1985). 
 41. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 72. 
 42. See Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 926 P.2d 1130 (Alaska 1996). 
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disclosed to a recipient: (1) submission occurs by the idea person without 
advance warning and without solicitation and before objection by the 
recipient; (2) submission occurs by the idea person without solicitation 
by the recipient, but the recipient allows the disclosure; and (3) “a 
solicited submission.”43  Under the first two scenarios, a court will not 
find an implied contract because an idea person cannot impose a 
confidential relationship upon another without the other’s consent.44  The 
third scenario, where the recipient asks for the idea person to disclose the 
idea, “implies a promise to pay for the idea if the recipient uses it.”45 
In the case of the tax strategy scenario, the accounting firm must 
claim that the implied promised payment includes confidentiality.  This 
claim has enough problems in itself, and can only be resolved by 
showing that not only did the recipients not object to receiving the idea, 
but that they in fact solicited the idea or otherwise meant to be bound by 
a confidentiality agreement.  Accordingly, a court must ask whether the 
client and her attorney knew or should have known that the strategy in 
fact amounts to a trade secret.46  The necessity of this inquiry, in turn, 
puts a heavy burden on the recipients to make the same conclusions of 
law that a court will make about the trade secrets status of the strategy.  
As previously noted, such an inquiry also presents a litany of pitfalls and 
uncertainties.  Moreover, the recipients must make this critical and very 
difficult determination in an atmosphere of severely limited information 
since the accounting firm will likely divulge at best incomplete details 
about the strategy. 
However, assuming that the accounting firm can demonstrate an 
implied confidentiality agreement or a voluntary confidential 
relationship, at least two additional problems arise.  First, what 
consideration does the proprietor furnish in exchange for an implied 
agreement not to use or publish the idea?  Second, what degree of 
novelty must the idea involve for the law to protect it as a trade secret? 
This comment has already demonstrated the difficulty in answering 
the first question regarding consideration versus definiteness in 
contracting for confidentiality in exchange for a secret tax-planning 
strategy.  The answer to the second problem, regarding what level of 
novelty the law requires, depends on whether the accounting firm claims 
a confidential relationship or an implied-in-fact contract.  If the firm 
claims an implied-in-fact contract, then a severe split in authority 
suggests that courts may or may not demand a novel idea to support an 
 
 43. Id. at 1140-41. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 1141. 
 46. See generally Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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enforceable contract.47  California dispenses with the novelty 
requirement: 
The policy that precludes protection of an abstract idea by copyright 
does not prevent its protection by contract.  Even though an idea is not 
property subject to exclusive ownership, its disclosure may be of 
substantial benefit to the person to whom it is disclosed.  That 
disclosure may therefore be consideration for a promise to pay.48 
On the other had, New York still requires a novel idea, even in the case 
of implied contracts, to support protection of an idea in trade secrets law: 
“[W]hen one submits an idea to another, no promise to pay for its use 
may be implied, and no asserted agreement enforced, if the elements of 
novelty and originality are absent.”49  If the accounting firm claims an 
implied contract in a state following the New York rule, the firm will 
have a difficult time proving novelty, given the difficulty of showing that 
the entire industry has no knowledge of the strategy, as noted in Part II 
above. 
On the other hand, if the accounting firm cannot successfully prove 
an implied-in-fact contract, the accounting firm must rely on its last 
resort, a confidential relationship.  Under the Restatement of Torts, 
“[o]ne who discloses or uses another’s trade secret, without a privilege to 
do so, is liable to the other if . . . his disclosure or use constitutes a 
breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret 
to him.50 
As the comment to this provision states, the proprietor of a trade secret 
may not unilaterally create a confidential relationship without the 
knowledge or consent of the party to whom he discloses the secret.  No 
particular form of notice is necessary, however; the question is whether 
the recipient of the information knew or should have known that the 
disclosure was made in confidence.51 
A confidential relationship may thus arise where the recipients solicited 
the idea, or at least knew or should have known the accounting firm 
would disclose the idea in confidence and took no steps to stop it. 
The existence of a confidential relationship does not prevent the 
greatest problem in this case.  Where the accounting firm approaches the 
client and her attorney, offers to disclose the strategy, and the client and 
 
 47. See Stanley v. Columbia Broad.  Sys., 221 P.2d 73, 85, 35 Cal.2d 653, 674 (1950) 
(Traynor, J., dissenting) (stating California law does not require novelty); but see Downey v. Gen. 
Foods Corp., 286 N.E.2d 257, 259, 334 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (1972) (requiring novelty). 
 48. Stanley, 221 P.2d at 85 (Traynor, J., dissenting). 
 49. Downey, 286 N.E.2d at 259. 
 50. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757(b) (1939). 
 51. Smith v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 833 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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her attorney know that such confidential disclosures will occur in the 
course of making a deal, most courts say a confidential relationship 
arises.52  In this case, the accounting firm can claim breach of the 
confidential relationship if the client or her attorney uses the strategy 
without having paid the accounting firm for its use and because the 
parties impliedly developed a confidential relationship. 
Instead, the problem arises because most jurisdictions require a novel 
idea to support a finding of a breached confidential relationship.53  
Again, the strategies’ novelty will prove difficult to show.  Thus, the 
accounting firm will have a difficult time recovering damages for breach 
of a confidential relationship. 
To recover for breach of a confidentiality contract, the accounting 
firm must prove the existence of either an express contract or an implied 
contract.  In the case of an express contract, the firm will struggle to 
show both definiteness and consideration at the same time.  In the case of 
an implied contract, the firm will struggle with the same problems as in 
the express contract context, but with the added burden in many 
jurisdictions of proving a novel idea.  In the absence of an express or 
implied contract, an accounting firm may still recover for breach of a 
confidential relationship, but with the very difficult burden of proving a 
novel idea, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the action ensues or the 
transaction occurred.  This section demonstrates that, in any event, 
accounting firms will always struggle to recover for breach of a 
confidentiality agreement or for breach of a confidential relationship. 
B. Ethical Problems 
Even if an accounting firm succeeds in fashioning an enforceable 
confidentiality agreement, ethical rules may still prevent an attorney 
from binding herself to confidence.  At least two major ethical rules enter 
into this problem.  First, such a transaction may impermissibly create a 
conflict of interests between the client for whom the attorney signs the 
agreement and the attorney’s other clients.  Second, such a transaction 
may impermissibly restrict the attorney’s ability to practice law. 
1.  Conflicts of interest 
Under ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7(b), an 
attorney may not enter into a transaction with one client that will 
compromise the interests of the attorney’s other clients. 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. See, e.g., Johnson v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 788 A.2d 906, 916 (N.J. Super. 2002); Paul 
v. Haley, 183 A.D.2d 44, 52, 588 N.Y.S.2d 897, 903 (1992). 
PETERSON-MACRO 2/21/2003  4:06 PM 
163] TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIALITY 179 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if . . .  (2) . . . the representation 
of [that client may] be materially limited by the lawyer’s 
responsibilities to another client . . . or a third person, or by [the 
lawyer’s own interests], [unless]: (b)(1) the lawyer reasonably believes 
the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client 
consents after consultation. . . .54 
The Illinois State Bar Association (ISBA) released an advisory 
opinion in October 2000, interpreting Rule 1.7(b) in the context of the 
fact scenario hypothesized above.55  In this opinion, the ISBA advised 
that the attorney who enters into a confidentiality agreement in this 
context impermissibly creates a conflict of interests between the clients 
for whom the attorney signs the agreement and the attorney’s other 
clients. 
[T]he package of ideas (the ‘information’) includes interpretations and 
applications of the tax laws and regulations that would be useful to 
Lawyer in performing legal services for Clients B, C. and D.  Thus, we 
assume that once Lawyer has learned of the Information, she will be 
prohibited from applying ideas that would directly assist her 
representation of other clients. Based upon that assumption, if Lawyer 
were to sign the Confidentiality Agreement, Lawyer would have a 
conflict of interest in representing Clients B, C and D.56 
Moreover, the ISBA opinion states that it doubts whether an attorney 
could cure such a conflict by obtaining informed consent from the 
attorney’s other clients.57  No client would likely give such consent when 
the client knows that the attorney has useful tax-planning strategies that 
could benefit the client.58  Even if the attorney could obtain such consent, 
however, “it does not appear that [the attorney] could reasonably assume 
 
 54. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b).  The American Law Institute proposed a 
similar restraint on attorneys entering into relationships involving conflicts of interest. 
§ 201.  Basic Prohibition of Conflict of Interest.  Unless all affected clients and other 
necessary persons consent to the representation  . . . a lawyer may not represent a client if 
the representation would involve a conflict of interest.  A conflict of interest is involved if 
there is a substantial risk that the lawyer’s representation of the client would be materially 
and adversely affected by the lawyer’s own interests or by the lawyer’s duties to another 
current client, to a former client, or to a third person. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 201 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 
1996)). 
 55. Ill. State Bar Ass’n., supra note 1. 
 56. Id. 
 57. The ALI proposal also imposes a consent requirement to cure conflicts of interest.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 202 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 
(1996).  However, “[n]otwithstanding the informed consent of each affected client or former client, a 
lawyer may no represent a client if . . . (c) in the circumstances, it is not reasonably likely that the 
lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the clients.”  Id. § 
202(2)(c). 
 58. Ill. State Bar Ass’n., supra note 1. 
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that withholding material tax strategies would not adversely affect 
Clients B, C, and D.”59 
The ISBA opinion does not constitute binding ethical authority over 
attorney conduct, nor does it represent the opinion of the majority of 
state bar associations.  However, the opinion soundly analyzes and 
interprets Rule 1.7(b) within the Rule’s clear language.  Given the facts 
hypothesized above, it seems no good argument supports the conclusion 
that an attorney could ethically sign an agreement if the attorney 
presently represents other clients who could benefit from the proposed 
strategy.60 
2. Restraint on ability to practice law 
However, what if the attorney does not presently represent other 
clients who could benefit from the proposed strategy?  The ISBA opinion 
also draws from Rule 5.6 in support of its conclusion that signing a 
confidentiality agreement under these facts would violate attorney 
ethics.61  Rule 5.6 reads in pertinent part, 
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: (a) a 
partnership . . . [or] employment . . . agreement that restricts the rights 
of a lawyer to practice after termination of a relationship . . . or (b) an 
agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part 
of the settlement of a client controversy.62 
While the facts do not hypothesize an attorney who enters into “a 
partnership or employment agreement,” the transaction may nevertheless 
violate “the spirit of Rule 5.6.”63 
The comments to Model Rule 5.6(b) explain that the rule was designed 
to prohibit lawyers from entering into agreements that “restrict a 
lawyer’s right to represent certain clients or to sue specific parties as 
part of a settlement of a controversy.”  ABA Formal Opinion No. 93-
371 cited three reasons for Rule 5.6(b): 
First, permitting such agreements restricts the access of the public to 
lawyers, who, by virtue of their background and experience, might be 
the very best available talent to represent these individuals. . . .  
Second, the use of such agreements may provide clients with rewards 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. One must never forget, however, that the strategy in question likely has no unique value 
the attorney could not obtain for her clients in other ways.  Thus, this discussion will remain largely 
academic, affecting few, if any, clients’ interests.  Accordingly, this ethical discussion focuses on the 
unlikely situation where a confidentiality agreement would protect a legitimately valuable strategy. 
 61. Ill. State Bar Ass’n., supra note 1. 
 62. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6(a), (b) (2002). 
 63. Ill. State Bar Ass’n., supra note 1. 
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that bear less relationship to the merits of their claims than they do to 
the desire of the defendant to “buy off” plaintiff’s counsel.  Third, the 
offering of such restrictive agreements places the plaintiff’s lawyer in a 
situation where there is conflict between the interests of present clients 
and those of future clients.64 
Accordingly, the ISBA opinion weighs the interests of future clients 
against the immediate benefit that the present client could derive from 
disclosure of the strategy.65  It concludes that the attorney may not 
ethically create conflicts between the present client and the interests of 
future clients, and that signing a confidentiality agreement in this 
situation creates such conflicts of interests.66 
Michael L. Shakman and Marc O. Beem criticize the ISBA opinion 
in the Chicago Bar Association Record by responding that to disallow 
the attorney from signing such agreements may negatively and unfair 
impact the present client’s interests: 
If the lawyer did not have other clients similarly interested in the 
accountant’s idea when the accountant sought the lawyer’s agreement 
to confidentiality, most of the reasoning of the Opinion suggests that 
the lawyer could agree. . . . The reference in the Opinion to the spirit of 
Rule 5.6 clouds this conclusion, for it focuses upon the “conflict 
between the interest of Lawyer’s current Client A and those of future 
clients who could benefit from the knowledge.”  Rule 5.6 should not 
control if the lawyer is to give proper weight to the interest of the 
lawyer’s present client.  That client wants immediate access to the 
accountant’s presumably beneficial ideas, and is prepared to pay.  That 
client will be immediately prejudiced if use of the idea is withheld.  It 
seems difficult to justify such harm to a current client because of an 
ethical rule focused on the interest of a potential future client, who may 
or may not ever approach the lawyer at a time when the idea is still 
relevant.67 
In other words, the present client’s interests are real, concrete, 
immediate, and measurable, while the future clients’ interests are 
hypothetical and speculative.  Shakman and Beem argue that the ISBA 
opinion, in allowing these hypothetical interests to outweigh the real 
interests of the present client, dogmatically applies ethical rules in 
unrealistic ways to the detriment of all clients presently in need of secret 
tax-planning strategies. 
 
 64. Id. (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility Formal Op. 93-371 (1993)) 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Michael L. Shakman & Marc O. Beem, Can Lawyers Protect, and Sell at Premium, a 
Secret and Valuable Idea?, 15 CHI. B.A. REC., July 15, 2001, at 49. 
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Such a rule would prejudice all present clients who might have a need 
for the confidential information and are willing to pay for it.  These 
clients would have to do without either the valuable information or the 
assistance of a lawyer in the matter.  The Opinion does not consider 
this issue.68 
This analysis fails to overcome the concerns outlined in the ISBA 
opinion for at least two reasons: (1) it brazenly ignores the time-honored 
ethical tradition that Rule 5.6 codifies and which virtually all states who 
follow the ABA Model Rules accept; and (2) it wrongly assumes that the 
secret strategies promoted by accounting firms necessarily have 
sufficient worth that preventing a client from obtaining the strategies 
would prejudice the client’s interests. 
First, Shakman and Beem’s analysis disregards the policy concerns 
and ethical traditions behind Rule 5.6.  Citing the speculative and 
unimportant interests of future clients,69 the analysis relegates Rule 5.6 to 
a historical curiosity and a present ethical irrelevancy.  Shakman and 
Beem’s discussion of future client’s interests unfairly and incompletely 
characterizes the purpose of Rule 5.6.  Reasonable people may disagree 
over the relative weight that the ethics rules give to the interests of 
potential future clients compared with those of present clients.  However, 
those interests do not represent the entire policy behind Rule 5.6 and its 
prohibition against attorneys binding themselves to agreements that 
restrict their ability to practice law.70  ABA Formal Opinion 93-371 lists 
three public policy interests protected by Rule 5.6 that are in addition to 
future clients’ interests that Shakman and Beem apparently consider 
inadequate to support the ISBA opinion’s conclusions. 
First, permitting such agreements restricts the access of the public to 
lawyers, who, by virtue of their background and experience, might be 
the very best available talent to represent these individuals. . . .  
Second, the use of such agreements may provide clients with rewards 
that bear less relationship to the merits of their claims than they do to 
the desire of the defendant to “buy off” plaintiff’s counsel. Third, the 
offering of such restrictive agreements places the plaintiff’s lawyer in a 
 
 68. Id. at 51. 
 69. Id. at 49 (“It seems difficult to justify such a harm to a current client because of an ethical 
rule focused on the interest of a potential future client, who may or may not ever approach the 
lawyer at a time when the idea is still relevant.”). 
 70. In fairness to Shakman and Beem, the ISBA opinion itself focused only on the interests 
of future clients as the sole principle behind this ethical dilemma.  Ill. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 1.  
(“The third reason [proffered by ABA Formal Opinion No. 93-371] applies in the situation at hand.  
The terms of the Confidentiality Agreement would create a conflict between the interest of Lawyer’s 
Current Client A and those of future clients who could benefit from the knowledge gained by 
Lawyer from Accounting Firm.”).  Shakman and Beem merely hone in on this limited analysis of the 
ethical problem. 
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situation where there is conflict between the interests of present clients 
and those of future clients.71 
Not only do future clients’ interests weigh against the present client’s 
interests, but so do the general public’s interest in the free-flow of 
competent legal advice, coupled with the danger of lawyers self-dealing 
by entering into agreements restricting the availability of their advice.  
Further, not only does an attorney self-dealing itself raise ethical 
problems, but also it possibly inappropriately allows outside third parties 
access to the all-important attorney-client relationship. 
The first policy concern deals not only with the public’s (and by 
implication future clients’) right to consult with this particular attorney, 
but also with the public’s interest in the substance of the legal advice 
itself.  The law generally disfavors the restriction of trade, and imposes 
ethical rules such as Rule 5.6 to curb the restriction of legal advice 
particularly. 
Although the secret strategies promoted by accounting firms will 
generally provide little or no value to clients, a strategy which does 
provide real value makes an even stronger case in support of disallowing 
confidentiality agreements.  The ISBA notes, “We have assumed that the 
tax package to be disclosed by Accounting Firm to Client A contains 
legal advice or analysis.”72  The next section deals directly with the 
problems of attorneys assisting accounting firms in the unauthorized 
practice of law.  The problem here, however, rests in the fact that tax-
planning strategies have the nature of legal advice, which public policy 
should allow to flow freely from attorneys to the public. 
The problem of future clients’ interests remains only academic, 
Shakman and Beem seem to argue, and therefore, weighs lightly against 
the interests of the present client.  However, even assuming that 
Shakman and Beem balance the interests correctly, the conclusion in 
favor of allowing confidentiality agreements remains correct only so 
long as no other clients seek to retain the attorney.  Once another client 
in fact seeks to retain the attorney’s services, the attorney may not 
represent that client, pursuant to Rule 1.7(b), without first obtaining full 
informed consent from the new client.  As already noted, that consent 
will prove difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.  Even if the attorney can 
obtain the consent, the attorney must still objectively determine whether 
the withholding of the strategy will substantively affect the client’s tax or 
estate plan.  As already noted, this will also prove difficult, if not 
impossible, to overcome.  If the attorney’s entire practice consists of tax 
 
 71. Id. (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility Formal Op. 93-371 (1993)). 
 72. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 1. 
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and estate planning, then this confidentially agreement may in fact 
utterly limit to the attorney to one client for whom the attorney signed 
the agreement, and for the entire duration of the agreement.  If the 
agreement requires indefinite confidentiality, then the attorney may find 
that her career has disappeared.  This result clearly violates Rule 5.6. 
The second policy concern behind Rule 5.6, the “desire of the 
defendant to ‘buy off’ plaintiff’s counsel,”73 seems to arise more out of 
the litigation model of attorney representation than from a planning or 
transactional model.74  Nevertheless, attorney self-dealing may remain a 
possibility even outside of the litigation setting.  Thus, the potential 
harms to the public interest in the form of restricting the free-flow of 
legal advice, the potential for attorney self-dealing, and the potential 
conflicts with future clients’ interests all combine to present a powerful 
argument against permitting attorneys to sign confidentiality agreements 
in this context.  Thus, Shakman and Beem’s ethical analysis focuses 
inappropriately only on the ethical duties of the attorney to her clients, 
neglecting the ethical duty which the attorney owes to “the system” as a 
whole. 
Ordinarily, in performing his duty to the client, the lawyer carries out 
his duty to the system well.  There are times, however, when the 
lawyer, while pursuing his client’s interests competently, loyally, and 
discreetly, must hold himself and his client’s interests in check in order 
to perform the less defined, and seemingly contradictory duty which he 
owes to the system as a whole.75 
The second error in Shakman and Beem’s analysis, that it assumes 
the secret strategies promoted by accounting firms have sufficient worth 
to the client’s interests, ignores the realities of the tax planning industry, 
where few or no tax planners ever develop new strategies entirely 
unavailable to the rest of the industry.  Further, the analysis ignores the 
reality that, even if a firm did develop a new strategy, the firm could not 
protect the strategy for long.76  Even if the firm could protect the 
strategy’s secrecy, the firm would struggle to place an attorney under a 
binding confidentiality agreement. 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. “[The] Model Rules of Professional Conduct . . . [are] composed largely of general, 
litigation-based rules that do not address many of the difficult problems that arise in specific areas of 
practice.” JOHN R. PRICE, J. ET AL, ACTEC COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 7 (3d ed. 1999). 
 75. BERNARD WOLFMAN & JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAXATION 
PRACTICE 1-2 (3d ed. 1995). 
 76. Jacobs, supra note 3, at 70 (“‘Would my client have to wait another week or another 
month or another 90 days?’ [Gibbons] asks.  ‘Nothing’s going to hold out much longer than that.’”). 
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Thus, the attorney may still serve the present client’s interests, even 
without signing the agreement and without purchasing this particular 
strategy from this particular accounting firm.  After all, seldom do tax 
planners find only one perfect solution to their clients’ problems to all 
exclusion of other possible and comparatively beneficial strategies.  Of 
course, these realities make most confidentiality agreements more 
irrelevant than unethical.  However, even in a case where the accounting 
firm has something of real value to offer, a confidentiality agreement 
would unethically restrict the lawyer’s ability to practice law during the 
period that the strategy remains a secret. 
3. Unauthorized practice of law77 
The final ethical dilemma implicated by the hypothesized facts and 
addressed by the ISBA opinion arises out of Rule 5.5(b), which prohibits 
attorneys from assisting others in the unauthorized practice of law.78 
Pursuant to . . . Rule 5.5(b), a lawyer is prohibited from assisting “a 
person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity 
that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law.” We have assumed 
that the tax package to be disclosed by Accounting Firm to Client A 
contains legal advice or analysis.  Although the services performed by 
accountants and lawyers do overlap in some areas, there is a line that 
can be crossed at some point at which the accountant’s services may 
become the “practice of law.”79 
Although the opinion does not conclude whether, under these facts, 
the attorney assists the accounting firm in the unauthorized practice of 
law,80 it suggests that the lawyer who signs such an agreement at least 
implicates a Rule 5.5(b) question.  American jurisprudence lists the 
following activities as the unauthorized practice of law: 
Drafting and supervising the execution of wills for others. . . . The 
assembling, drafting, execution, and funding of a living trust document 
constitutes the practice of law because a living trust document involves 
the disposition of property at death and, thus, requires legal expertise; 
however, non lawyers may gather the necessary information for the 
living trust.  One not licensed to practice law who advises a particular 
person as to wills, trusts, and other schemes for the conservation and 
 
 77. BERNARD WOLFMAN & JAMES P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX 
PRACTICE 1-2 (3d ed. 1995). 
 78. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(b) (2002). 
 79. Ill. State Bar Ass’n., supra note 1 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(b) 
(2002)). 
 80. Id. “Unauthorized practice of law questions are very fact specific and therefore no 
opinion can be stated on that issue given the general facts presented in the inquiry.” Id. 
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disposition of his or her estate at death, thereby engages in the 
unauthorized practice of law, whether such advice is offered as a 
separate service or as an incident to carrying on the business of selling 
insurance.81 
Activities designed to secure tax reductions or refunds for others may 
constitute the unauthorized practice of law.  Factors that are significant 
in determining whether such activity constitutes the practice of law 
[include] . . . whether the special knowledge required for the 
undertaking is legal or economic. . . . It was intimated, though not 
decided, in one case that when an accountant deals with a question of 
law which is only incidental to preparing a tax return, he or she is not 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.  But an accountant may 
not as an independent service render opinions regarding tax liability 
based on his or her study of authorities in order to construe a tax 
statute.  Other jurisdictions have rejected the incidental test and have 
ruled that an accountant may not give legal advice or do legal work 
even in connection with his or her regular work as an accountant in tax 
matters.82 
A court’s determination whether the accounting firm’s preparation 
and sale of tax-planning strategies constitutes the unauthorized practice 
of law depends on a highly fact-specific inquiry.83  However, given the 
guidelines and holdings outlined in American Jurisprudence, cited above, 
the accounting firm at least sits dangerously on the edge of entering 
territory historically reserved only for licensed attorneys.84  If the law of 
a given jurisdiction would hold the accounting firm in our fact scenario 
to liability for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, then the 
ethical rules forbid an attorney to assist the accounting firm in that 
practice.85 
Assuming that the accounting firm’s practice constitutes the 
unauthorized practice of law,86 the final question then rests in whether 
 
 81. AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 122 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 82. AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 126 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 83. Ill. State Bar Ass’n., supra note 1 (“Unauthorized practice of law questions are very fact 
specific and therefore no opinion can be stated on that issue given the general facts presented in the 
inquiry.”) 
 84. See 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 122 (Supp. 2002) (“Corporation in business of 
creating and selling complex estate planning documents engaged in unauthorized practice of law 
when nonlawyer [sic] employees answered customers’ specific legal questions, determined 
appropriateness of living trust based on customers’ particular needs and circumstances, assembled, 
drafted, and executed documents and funded living trusts; although trust documents were reviewed 
by attorneys, employees’ conduct went beyond mere gathering of necessary information.”) See 
generally Fla. Bar v. Am. Senior Citizens Alliance, Inc. 689 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1997). 
 85. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(b) (2002). 
 86. See generally, LAWS MAN. ON PROF’L CONDUCT (ABA/BNA), 21:8201 for an excellent 
discussion of what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. 
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the attorney’s transaction with that firm, in signing a confidentiality 
agreement and counseling the client to do the same, constitutes 
assistance within the meaning of Rule 5.5(b).  If the lawyer’s conduct 
does constitute assistance within the meaning of that rule, then the 
lawyer may not ethically engage in that transaction. 
In summary, the lawyer who signs a confidentiality agreement with 
an accounting firm likely violates at least three fundamental rules of 
ethics.  The lawyer violates Rule 1.7(b) by creating unethical conflicts of 
interest between the current clients.  Such conflicts arise because the 
attorney no longer has the ability to bring all her knowledge and ability 
to bear on the problems of the clients for whom the attorney did not enter 
into a confidentiality agreement.  The attorney also violates Rule 5.6(b) 
by restricting her ability to practice law and creating conflicts of interest 
with future clients.  While some debate continues regarding the relevance 
of the policies underlying Rule 5.6(b) in the tax-planning context, the 
rule nevertheless stands as an ethical barrier to the attorney signing such 
an agreement.  Further, the polices underlying Rule 5.6(b) may still play 
an important role in securing the public interest beyond future clients’ 
interests.  Finally, the lawyer may violate Rule 5.6(b) by assisting the 
accounting firm in the unauthorized practice of law.  While the legal 
profession may incrementally loosen this standard as multi-disciplinary 
practice becomes more common and more acceptable, this ethical 
standard nevertheless remains relevant and binding authority.  No 
general rule appears readily available to determine whether under the 
hypothesized facts the attorney violates this rule.  Attorneys should 
therefore carefully consider this ethical rule when trying to decide 
whether to sign a confidentially agreement with an accounting firm. 
C. Third-Party Beneficiaries of Secrets 
Allowing attorneys to sign confidentiality agreements with respect to 
proprietary tax-planning strategies would result in at least one 
devastating result: third-party beneficiary liability to the proprietor.  
Many jurisdictions, in protecting proprietors’ interests in trade secrets, 
imposes a duty upon third parties who benefit from the defendant’s 
misappropriation of the idea to know whether the idea they are 
purchasing from the defendant constitutes a protected trade secret.87  In 
these jurisdictions, if the third party knew or should have known that the 
defendant misappropriated the idea the third party purchased from the 
 
 87. See Metallurical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1204 (5th Cir. 1986) (“The 
law imposes liability not only on those who wrongfully misappropriate trade secrets by breach of 
confidence but also, in certain situations, on others who might benefit from the breach.”). Rule 
10.9(a). 
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defendant, then a court will impose liability on the third party as well as 
the defendant.88 
One who discloses or uses another’s trade secret, without a privilege to 
do so, is liable to the other if . . . (c) he learned the secret from a third 
person with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that the third 
person’s disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the 
other. . . 
One has notice of facts under the rule stated in this Section when he 
knows of them or when he should know of them. . . . He should know 
of them if, from the information which he has, a reasonable man would 
infer the facts in question or if, under the circumstances, a reasonable 
man would be put on inquiry and under an inquiry pursued with 
reasonable intelligence and diligence would disclose the facts.89 
This puts an enormous burden on the third party, because she must 
become judge and jury to determine whether the direct defendant stole 
the secret obtained it legitimately.90 
In our facts, third-party liability means that all tax-planning clients 
and potential clients must always inquire of their attorney whether the 
attorney misappropriated any proprietary strategies for the clients’ 
benefit.  Third-party liability also means, however, that where the client 
knows or should know the attorney has confidential dealings with 
accounting firms, the clients must inquire of those accounting firms 
whether the strategies the attorney proposes constitutes proprietary trade 
secrets owned by the accounting firms.91 
Allowing attorneys to enter into confidential relationships with 
accounting firms regarding secret tax-planning strategies creates two 
serious problems in the third-party beneficiary context.  First, third-party 
liability creates a highly charged, potentially litigious atmosphere where 
seeking legal advice may expose clients and their attorneys to liability in 
tort.  Second, such exposure creates an additional restraint on the 
attorney’s ability to practice law by providing a strong disincentive for 
clients to seek legal advice.  As already noted, Rule 5.6 deals with 
attorneys entering into relationships that limit their ability to practice 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. 1 (1939)). 
 90. For this idea, I am indebted to Professor Jean Burns.  Professor Burns proposed this idea 
during a lecture on February 29, 2002 regarding Metallurgical Industries, Inc. v. Fourtek as a 
problem inherent in third-party beneficiary liability in trade secrets law.  She did not apply this idea 
directly to the problem at hand, although if the proposition applies in general trade secrets law, then 
it probably will apply in this context as well. 
 91. Metallurgical Indus. Inc., 790 F.2d at 1204 (“[I]n attention to possible wrongdoing . . . 
amounts to a failure to reasonably inquire into the facts involved. . . . [The third-party defendant] 
might therefore be held accountable, provided it used any trade secrets conveyed.”). 
PETERSON-MACRO 2/21/2003  4:06 PM 
163] TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIALITY 189 
law.92  Whether or not the contractual relationship between the attorney 
and the accounting firm directly violates Rule 5.6, the disincentive 
created by that relationship seems to further violate “the spirit of Rule 
5.6” by potentially freezing the free flow of competent legal advice. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As presently constituted, the laws of trade secrets and contracts and 
the rules of attorney ethics largely disfavor both trade secret protection 
for tax-planning strategies and confidentiality agreements between 
attorneys and accounting firms.  Accounting firms will struggle to prove 
that tax-planning strategies amount to novel ideas that meet the definition 
of trade secrets.  This struggle arises out of both evidentiary problems in 
proving novelty and from the economic realities of the industry, both of 
which make tax strategies unlikely candidates to receive trade secrets 
protection.  Most accounting firms seem to recognize the uncertain 
ground on which their trade secrets claims stand, and therefore, attempt 
to impose duties of confidentiality on clients and clients’ attorneys.  
However, these confidential relationships and confidentiality contracts 
stand on perhaps even shakier ground than the trade secrets claims.  The 
confidential relationships claims suffer from the same problem as the 
trade secrets claims.  More importantly, the confidentiality agreements 
likely fail to satisfy both definiteness requirements and consideration 
requirements at the same time. 
Even if the law will enforce such agreements, attorneys may not sign 
them because of three fundamental attorney ethics rules.  These 
agreements violate Rule 1.7(b) by creating conflicts of interest between 
the attorney’s clients; they violate Rule 5.6(b) by restricting the 
attorney’s ability to practice law; and they may violate Rule 5.5(b) by 
obligating the attorney to assist the accounting firm in the unauthorized 
practice of law.  If an accounting firm can prove the existence of a trade 
secret, prove the existence of an enforceable contract, and show that the 
contract does not force the attorney into violating ethical rules, one last 
problem remains.  The potential consequences of protecting tax-planning 
strategies by imposing trade secrets law, by allowing attorneys to enter 
confidentiality agreements, and by enforcing those contracts should 
seriously harm the public interest by imposing third-party liability on 
clients and potential clients.  This liability contradict both the spirit of 
Rule 5.6 and the public good generally by providing a severe 
disincentive for clients to seek counsel, thus freezing the free flow of 
competent legal advice. 
 
 92. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2002). 
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Ultimately, the laws of trade secrets and contracts, as well as the 
rules of attorney ethics seek to promote the public interest and to protect 
all parties’ substantive legal rights.  To the extent that accounting firms 
prove successful in enforcing confidentiality agreements, the public 
interest and clients’ rights suffer.  As demonstrated above, however, the 
law and rules as presently constituted already protect the public from 
these undesirable consequences.  The tax bar must continue to inquire, 
however, into the inevitable developments of multi-disciplinary practice, 
the consequences of those developments, and the changes the law must 
make to accommodate the public interest in that context.  Such an 
inquiry, however, must not ignore the considerations outlined in this 
comment in order to accommodate multi-disciplinary practice.  Instead, 
such an inquiry should seek to develop multi-disciplinary practice in 
ways consistent with the whole body of trade secrets law, contract law, 
and ethical rules. 
Andrew Franklin Peterson 
 
